Abstract: Since the early 1990s, states have received unprecedented flexibility to determine Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) eligibility and program administration. We estimate that state SNAP policies accounted for 40 percent of the predicted caseload decline between 1993 and 2000 -primarily through the eligibility restrictions on noncitizens. More recent eligibility expansions and reductions in transaction costs explain 20 percent of the 2000-2011 caseload increase. The state unemployment rate plays a strong role in caseload changes over the study period, accounting for more than 60 percent of the predicted caseload decline between
I. Introduction
The Congressional testimony by Audrey Rowe, Administrator of the USDA agency that oversees SNAP, described efforts to "assist States with workload management while easing the burden of the application process for recipients, many of whom are new to the program" (Rowe, 2012 ). Rowe's testimony highlighted strategies such as aligning eligibility requirements across programs and streamlining interview processes. 1 The recent caseload growth raised concerns about the extent to which the unprecedented policy freedom provided to states increased SNAP caseloads and expenditures.
2 Figure 1 shows that, historically, SNAP was a countercyclical program; the caseload increases during recessionary times and declines during economic expansions. One notable exception occurred during the recovery from the 2001 recession, when the unemployment rate dropped, but the SNAP caseload continued to increase. While the rise in the number of low income individuals may explain a portion of the caseload increase, the role that specific state policies played in the program's growth is not fully understood. Although the Agricultural Act of 2014 did not eliminate state flexibility in program administration, the intensity of the deliberations regarding SNAP suggest that these state policy options will be a subject of continued debate. The goal of this paper is to understand the effect of specific state policy options and economic conditions on SNAP caseloads.
The decline of the food stamp caseload after the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), the landmark 1996 welfare reform legislation that replaced Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) with Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), prompted a number of studies that focused on the relative contributions of welfare reform and the improving economy to explain the decrease. Across studies, there is a large variation in the portion of the food stamp caseload decline explained by welfare reform, from roughly zero to as much as 40 percent (Figlio et al., 2000; Ziliak et 1 al., 2003; Blank and Wallace 1999; Currie and Grogger, 2001) . Researchers attribute between 6 and 20 percent of the Food Stamp caseload decline to macroeconomic conditions (Wallace and Blank 1999; Currie and Grogger, 2001 ). 3 Related research using individual data finds that specific policies such as requiring participants to more frequently verify their continued eligibility and exempting the value of vehicles from the eligibility critieria, affect food stamp participation and caseloads (Currie and Grogger, 2001; Mickelson and Lerman, 2004, McKernan and Ratcliffe, 2003; Kabbani and Wilde, 2003; Ratcliffe et al. 2008 ).
Recent work focuses on the factors behind the increase in the food stamp caseload since 2001. Researchers find SNAP participation to be very responsive to changes in economic conditions, with a one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate associated with increases in SNAP participation ranging from 4 to 11 percent (Bitler and Hoynes, 2010; Bitler and Hoynes, 2013; Ganong and Liebman, 2013; Klerman and Danielson, 2011; Ziliak, 2013) . Using individuallevel panel data, Ratcliffe et al. (2008) and Ribar et al. (2008 Ribar et al. ( , 2010 find evidence that policies that influence the transaction costs of SNAP participation affect program take-up. Overall, estimates from the research most closely related to ours suggest that economic conditions account for 27 to 45 percent of the recent caseload increase, while new state SNAP policies account for estimated 16 to 35 percent of the increase (Klerman and Danielson, 2011; Ziliak, 2013) . The primary focus of Klerman and Danielson (2011) is the role of welfare reform, SNAP policies, and economic conditions on the composition of state, monthly SNAP caseloads from 1989 to 2009. Ziliak (2013) seeks to explain SNAP 3 Other research on food stamp caseloads such as Heflin (2004) , Richburg-Hayes and Kwakye (2005) and Tschoepe and Hindera (1998) generally finds similar results.
caseload changes using annual, household survey data from 1980 to 2011. Our research extends the literature on SNAP caseload dynamics by examining a broader set of SNAP policies than previously available and using over 20 years of monthly SNAP administrative data that can precisely measure program participation and capture the timing of state policy implementation.
Our empirical approach is straightforward. We rely on variation across states and over time in economic conditions and policy from January 1990 through December 2011 to identify the role of these factors in changes in statelevel monthly SNAP caseloads. We broadly group thirteen policies into several, non-mutually exclusive, types: those that affect SNAP eligibility, those that affect the transaction costs associated with SNAP participation, those that affect the stigma of SNAP participation, those that affect outreach towards potentially eligible non-participants, and those that reflect other means-tested transfer programs. We compare the estimated effect of economic conditions and these state-level policies across static and dynamic first-differenced models with differing numbers of lags. We also compare our results between measuring the caseload based on the number of households receiving SNAP in each state and the number of individuals receiving SNAP in each state.
To preview our results, we find across specifications that the economy plays a central role in determining state caseloads but state-specific SNAP policies also contribute to the ups and downs of the caseload over the last two decades, both through policies that affect eligibility and policies that affect the costs of participation for those eligible. Specifically, we find that restricting the eligibility of legal noncitizens has a large and significant chilling effect on the caseload. Broad-based categorical eligibility, a policy that waives the SNAP asset test and increases income limits for many households, has a positive effect on caseload growth, but the effect is relatively small. Exempting vehicles from the SNAP asset test has a small effect in the short-run but the effect grows over a longer period. Providing transitional benefits to households leaving TANF has a significant, positive effect on the SNAP caseload.
We find that reducing the burdens associated with SNAP recertification and reporting requirements for income changes is associated with higher caseloads. Allowing households to submit applications online appears to have a small positive effect on the caseload, but estimates are not statistically significant in the dynamic specifications. Stigma, in the form of requiring SNAP applicants to be fingerprinted, has large negative effects on the caseload. In contrast, distributing benefits via electronic benefit transfer (EBT) cards is not robustly correlated with caseloads. We find little effect of federally funded radio and TV outreach ads on caseloads. Finally, policies related to other means-tested programs contribute to SNAP caseload changes, as both the expansion of state and federal EITC programs and welfare reform both had a long-term, negative effect on the caseload.
The next section of the paper describes SNAP and its recent history.
Section III considers the caseload data and how to parameterize the institutional details to capture their effect on caseloads. Section IV describes the estimation results and Section V presents results from policy simulations. Section VI concludes.
II. SNAP: Institutional Details and Recent Program History
SNAP is designed to increase the food purchasing power of households with low levels of monthly income and assets. In 2014, SNAP participants received an average of $125 in monthly benefits per person (http://www.fns.usda.gov/pd/supplemental-nutrition-assistance-program-snap). In contrast with many other programs serving low-income households, SNAP eligibility does not generally depend on family structure, age, or disability status, so benefits reach a broad range of economically disadvantaged households. 4 The basic eligibility criteria for SNAP includes household gross income of 130 percent or less of the federal poverty level and household net income (gross income less certain deductions, such as a standard deduction and deductions for earned income, dependent care, utilities, and more) of 100 percent or less of the federal poverty level. Additionally, households must have $2,000 or less in assets. SNAP determines monthly benefits by subtracting 30 percent of household net income from a maximum benefit level that depends on household size. Nationwide, over 80 percent of eligible individuals participated in SNAP in 2012 (Eslami, 2014) but SNAP participation rates among eligible persons (take-up rates) vary widely across time and states, from a low of roughly 57 percent in California and Wyoming to over 90 percent in eight U.S. states (Cunnyngham, 2014) .
SNAP underwent a number of changes in the past two decades that altered the basic eligibility standards and program administration in ways that could affect both the difficulty in enrolling in and staying on the program. Table 1 illustrates the increasing variation in state-level SNAP policies. The 1996 welfare reform legislation made direct changes to SNAP eligibility, imposing strong restrictions on SNAP benefits to able-bodied adults without dependents (ABAWDs) and eliminating the eligibility of legal noncitizens to receive SNAP.
When welfare reform eliminated federal SNAP eligibility for legal noncitizens, a handful of states created and maintained state-funded food assistance programs for those that were otherwise ineligible for federal SNAP benefits. Subsequent legislation reinstated eligibility for legal noncitizen children, legal immigrants in 4 There are certain restrictions on the receipt of food stamps by legal immigrants and able-bodied adults without dependents (ABAWDs). Households receiving Supplemental Security Income (SSI) or Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) are categorically eligible.
the country for at least five years, and some specific legal immigrant groups, such as refugees. Still, changes to the citizenship rules lingered, particularly as some states eliminated or scaled back their state-funded food assistance programs. By 2011, although all otherwise eligible legal immigrant children could receive SNAP in all 51 states, nonelderly legal immigrant adults faced at least some restrictions on their SNAP eligibility in all but three states.
Welfare reform also had an indirect effect on SNAP participation because of the mechanical link between AFDC and SNAP eligibility and participation: specifically, AFDC recipients were "categorically eligible" to receive food stamps. The sharp declines in TANF, AFDC's replacement, recipients after PRWORA decreased the number of households that were categorically eligible for SNAP. Even among those who remained eligible for TANF, most TANF funds provided in-kind benefits, such as child care, which did not confer categorical eligibility for SNAP. The sharp declines in SNAP caseloads following welfare reform prompted regulatory and legislative changes to expand eligibility and reduce the burden of applying for SNAP. States were given more flexibility to simplify administration and increase program access, especially for low-income working families. In late 2000, states were authorized to extend SNAP categorical eligibility to households that receive noncash, as well as cash, TANF benefits. Over time, some states adopted a policy referred to as "broadbased categorical eligibility," which allows the state to remove the federal SNAP asset restriction and increase the income limit for most low-income households in the state. The number of states using broad-based categorical eligibility increased, particularly after 2006, and 41 states adopted the policy by 2011.
The post-PRWORA era saw additional reforms affecting eligibility, particularly the treatment of vehicles as household assets. States received the ability to align their definitions of income and assets with their TANF or Medicaid programs, as long as these definitions are less restrictive than the federal SNAP definitions. Some states chose to exclude the value of one or all vehicles in their TANF cash assistance program, and used the increased flexibility to do the same in determining SNAP eligibility. States were also given the option to provide an automatic SNAP benefit to families leaving TANF, for up to five months after their TANF exit. In 2011, 21 states offered transitional SNAP benefits to TANF leavers, with all of these states choosing to offer the full five months of benefits.
Throughout the post-PRWORA period of emphasizing labor force participation among lower income populations, state policies also changed with respect to how recipients must establish their continued eligibility for the program. State recertification periods-the number of months that can elapse before a SNAP household has to recertify eligibility -shortened dramatically through the 1990s as states sought ways to avoid federally-administered penalties for benefit calculation errors (Rosenbaum, 2000) . Short recertification periods increase the difficulty of continued program participation for working families, in particular, who may need to take off from work to complete the recertification process. The 2000s saw states lengthen the recertification periods in an effort to increase access to SNAP, particularly among low-income working households.
In between certifications, households who receive food stamps must report changes in circumstances that may affect their eligibility or monthly benefit. Before 2000, recipients had to report monthly and within ten days of a change in circumstances that could affect eligibility. Since 2000, all states have the option to allow SNAP recipients with earned income to report income changes on a quarterly or semi-annual basis, rather than each month or each time a change in circumstances occurs (U.S. GAO, 2002) . Semi-annual, or "simplified" reporting decreases reporting burdens on SNAP recipients because it requires households to report changes to their financial circumstances within reporting periods only if the changes would make them ineligible for the program. 
III. Data and Identification Strategy
We use the significant temporal and spatial variation in SNAP policies described in the previous section as the source of our identification in estimating the effect of these policies on the SNAP caseload. We measure the SNAP caseload at the state, monthly level from January 1990 through December 2011.
We use two measures: the number of households and the number of individuals receiving benefits. 6 We normalize each state-month individual caseload by the state's population and each state-month household caseload by the number of households in each state.
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Measuring a state's caseload at monthly intervals (versus annual intervals) can better capture the response to the precise timing of the change in policy and coincides with the timing of benefit payment.
Administrative caseload data capture the measure of interest to policymakers and avoid the substantial underreporting of SNAP receipt in household surveys 6 We are very grateful to Rebecca Blank and Geoffrey Wallace for providing us with the household level data between 1990 and 1998, and to Nadine Nichols of the Food and Nutrition Service, USDA for providing us with the additional data. The Census Bureau provides estimates of the state population in July of each year. The number of households in each state uses data from the March CPS, provided by IPUMS-CPS. For both estimates, we assume a constant rate of change and smooth each population throughout the year. (Meyer et al., 2009 ). The household caseload provides estimates for the relevant SNAP benefit unit while the individual caseload captures the number of persons that rely on benefits to meet their food needs.
The first set of covariates reflects state-level SNAP policy changes described in the previous section. Table 1 describes each of the covariates in selected years over our time period. To capture policies that affect mechanical eligibility for benefits, we include a vector of dichotomous variables. The first variable takes a value of one if noncitizens under age 65 face any restrictions to their SNAP eligibility. Limits on the eligibility for noncitizens should reduce the caseload through entry and exit, particularly in states with large immigrant populations. We also include dichotomous variables for state vehicle policies, parameterized as two dichotomous variables representing state policies to exempt at least one but not all vehicles in the household and state policies to exempt all vehicles in a household (state policies that do not exempt any vehicles serve as the omitted group); state policies providing up to five months of transitional SNAP benefits to those leaving TANF; and state adoption of broad-based categorical eligibility. We expect each of these policies to contribute to growth in the SNAP caseload by mechanically increasing the size of the eligible population.
Another set of variables captures SNAP policies that may affect stigma and transaction costs among those eligible for SNAP. While not mutually exclusive from those that affect stigma, we begin by considering policies that affect transaction costs. We include measures to capture the implementation of short recertification periods, defined as the proportion of working households subject to a certification period of three months or less; state reporting policies, defined as a dichotomous variables indicating the implementation of simplified (or biannual) reporting (with quarterly, monthly or change reporting as the omitted group); and, state online application availability, defined as a dichotomous variable for states that allowed submission of an application for SNAP benefits online. More frequent reporting and recertification policies should reduce the caseload by encouraging exit from the program at the reporting or recertification interval. Online applications should increase the ease of completing application by eliminating the need to travel to the local SNAP office to apply for benefits and encouraging entry into the program.
For policies affecting stigma, we include state EBT policies, defined as the portion of state SNAP benefits issued via EBT, and the implementation of fingerprinting requirements, defined as a dichotomous variable indicating the statewide use of fingerprinting during the application process.
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Use of EBT may increase caseloads by reducing the stigma of redeeming benefits, although the new technology may pose difficulties for some individuals and grocery stores to adopt. We presume that fingerprinting will reduce access by increasing the stigma associated with entry into the program.
We examine outreach efforts, which seek to provide information on the program to potentially eligible but non-participating populations. To capture this, we examine federally funded SNAP radio and TV advertisements. The media campaigns, which we characterize with a dichotomous variable indicating the airing of a federally funded TV or radio ad campaign in any media market in the state, may increase SNAP participation by reducing the costs of learning about the program and its eligibility criteria, in addition to reducing the transaction and stigma costs associated with the program. Moreover, because state willingness to accommodate any increase in applications was one criterion for deciding Previous research captures outreach through state outreach spending under a federally approved outreach plan (Kabbani and Wilde 2003; Ratcliffe et al. 2008; Ratcliffe et al. 2011; Ziliak 2013 ). This measure of outreach is problematic because it only captures state-level spending each fiscal year that is reimbursed by the federal government, rather than the total of state-level outreach spending and it would require smoothing the annual data to fit our monthly observations. Because of these measurement challenges, we chose not to include this variable in our estimates. placement of these ads, this variable also captures the willingness of states to expand the caseload through outreach and other practices that are difficult to measure.
Lastly, we control both for non-SNAP policies targeted at low-income populations and for the economic environment. Because of the close link between cash welfare programs and SNAP, we include a dichotomous variable indicating the earliest implementation of either an AFDC waiver or TANF. Acknowledging the importance of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) to the budgets of lowincome households, we capture the large variation in the generosity and timing of EITC receipt during the calendar year by multiplying the real EITC maximum credit value for a family with two children (based on the combined federal and state EITC, in thousands) by the portion of annual federal EITC payments made in each month. Table 1 shows the dramatic growth in state level EITC payments and Appendix Table 1 shows variation in annual payments over the calendar year.
We control for state economic conditions with the state unemployment rate, as shown in Table 1 .
In sum, to identify the relationship between SNAP caseloads, state SNAP policies, and other low-income policies, we use variation arising from differences across states and over the 252 months of our data. As shown in Table 1 
Under the first differenced specification, the state fixed effects, s  and t s  represent deviations from state trends. We use Driscoll-Kraay standard errors 11 According to Hanson and Oliveira (2007) , there was a 15 percent spike in SNAP caseloads in areas affected by Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma. Based on Hanson and Oliveira's analysis, we set this dummy variable equal to one in September, October, and November 2005 for the following states: Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas. These state-month combinations represent both SNAP Disaster Assistance claims by residents remaining in the Gulf Coast after the hurricane, as well as claims by Hurricane Katrina evacuees.
to account for spatial and temporal dependence in the covariance matrix (Driscoll and Kraay, 1998) . Table 2 and Table 3 provide the results of empirical estimation of the household and individual per capita caseload, respectively. Column 1 of each table provides static estimates using 12 lags of the explanatory variables while Column 2 provides static estimates using 24 lags of the explanatory variables.
IV. Results
Columns 3 and 4 provide results for the dynamic specification, which includes either 12 or 24 lags of the dependent variable. All reported estimates are the longrun effects and we report p-values from the F-test of joint significance below each estimate.
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Generally, specifying the dependent variable as either the household caseload or the individual caseload tends to produce similar long-run estimates.
This suggests that the SNAP policies we consider do not, by and large, have differing effects on larger households versus smaller households. Models that include 24 lags rather than 12 lags tend to have larger and more statistically significant long-run effects, implying that it can take more than a year for the SNAP caseload to respond to changes in policy and economic conditions.
We turn now to a specific discussion of the estimated effects of SNAP policies, beginning with SNAP policies affecting eligibility. We first discuss the effect of vehicle exemption policies, where the omitted category is that no We estimate that other policies intended to extend SNAP eligibility to more types of households increase caseloads. Providing transitional benefits to TANF leavers increases the caseload per capita between 2.7 percent and 5.2 percent after 12 months and between 4.5 percent and 6.4 percent after 24 months.
Broad-based categorical eligibility for SNAP increases the household caseload up to 5.9 percent and the individual caseload up to 10.5 percent after 24 months. The similarity of estimates in the model with 12 lags versus 24 lags suggests that most of the caseload increase in response to the adoption of broad-based categorical eligibility occurs within one year. Recent studies (Klerman and Danielson, 2011; Ganong and Leibman, 2013; Ziliak, 2013 ) also find similar effects of broad-based categorical eligibility.
In contrast to vehicle exemptions, transitional benefits and broad-based categorical eligibility, the eligibility restrictions on noncitizens reduce the size of the eligible population. We find large, negative effects of policies that prevent nonelderly noncitizens from receiving benefits. The effect is much larger in the long run, with caseload reduction of 14.8 to 24.8 percent after 24 months of the rule preventing noncitizens from receiving benefits, compared to 8.6 to 15.6 percent reductions in caseloads after 12 months. Table 4 shows that the large declines in caseloads in response to the eligibility restrictions have the expected differential effect in states with large populations of noncitizens.
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In particular, consider the results in the final column of Table 4 , from the dynamic model of the SNAP household caseload that includes 24 monthly lags of the explanatory variables. Imposing eligibility restrictions on nonelderly noncitizens lowers the caseloads by 35 percent in states that have large populations of noncitizens, relative to 22 percent in states that do not have large populations of noncitizens. In all cases, the estimated magnitude of the effect of these restrictions on SNAP eligibility of noncitizens on caseload appears very large, suggesting these policies affected participation not only by reducing the pool of eligible noncitizens, but also through a chilling effect that discouraged participation among eligible noncitizens. Evidence of chilling effects from the post-welfare reform change in the eligibility rules for legal noncitizens has also been found for other means-tested programs, including SNAP (Bitler and Hoynes, 2011; Borjas 2003; Borjas 2004, Fix and Passel, 1999) .
To define states as differentially affected, we tabulate the size of the adult population that is not native-born citizens in each state using IPUMS-CPS data from 1996 through 2012. Examining the states with the largest non-native citizen populations in each year, we find the largest populations in California, New York, Florida, Texas, New Jersey, and Illinois and a clear break in the distribution after these states. Specifications that defined states as differentially affected by examining the percent of the population that were not native-born citizens or the percent of the population that were not citizens produce similar results.
Among policies that affect the transaction costs associated with participating in SNAP, we estimate that short recertification periods for working households reduce the caseload, as first shown by Kabbani and Wilde (2003) .
With a 10 point increase in the percentage of working households with recertification periods of three months or less, the SNAP caseload declines by 1.3 to 2.4 percent. Kabbani and Wilde (2003) find similar effects during the 1990s.
Replacing monthly reporting requirements with simplified reporting policies have a long-run effect increasing the caseload by 2.7 to 5.8 percent after 12 months and similar effects after 24 months. While the availability of online SNAP applications may reduce the transaction costs of entering SNAP by eliminating the need to travel to a county office to complete the forms, the estimated effect is positive but not statistically significant in most specifications.
The point estimates are similar to Schwabish (2012) who finds in the first three years after the availability of online applications, per capita SNAP participation increases less than one percent per year.
Turning to policy variables that may affect stigma among the potential caseload, our results confirm the findings of Ratcliffe et al. (2008) and Ziliak et al. (2003) who find little to no effect of EBT on SNAP participation. Our long term estimates are statistically significant only in the models with 24 lags, however the estimates are small and negative in the static model and small and positive in the dynamic model.
In contrast, we find that requiring SNAP applicants to be fingerprinted, which we would expect to increase the stigma associated with benefit receipt, has a large negative effect on SNAP caseloads. Over a 12 month period, the implementation of a fingerprinting requirement reduces the caseload by 6.4 to 10.5 percent. After 24 months, a fingerprinting requirement reduces the caseload by 3.9 to 10.4 percent. As previously discussed, these policies occurred in states with large SNAP caseloads: Arizona, California, New York, and Texas. These large negative estimates are consistent with other research (Ratcliffe et al., 2008; Ratcliffe et al., 2011; Ziliak, 2013) The estimates on the effect of having a federally funded TV or radio campaign in at least one media market in the state are weak and contradictory, despite anecdotally evidence that the ads generated a large number of requests for program information and application assistance.. In the dynamic model, the results are positive but never statistically significant. In the static model, the estimates are negative, but close to zero. Prior studies using a different measure of outreach--outreach spending in the state under a federally-approved outreach plan--also found mixed results. Ratcliffe et al. (2008) find no effect of outreach spending on SNAP participation, Kabbani and Wilde (2003) find a positive effect only among working households, and Ziliak (2013) finds a small negative effect.
We find, as expected, that welfare reform has a significant negative effect on SNAP caseloads, which indicates that the mechanical link between AFDC and food stamps helps explain the decline in the SNAP caseload in the late 1990s. The long-run coefficient estimate on the indicator variable of implementation of either an AFDC waiver or TANF suggests that food stamp caseloads were 4.1 to 8.0 percent lower as a result of welfare reform.
Changes in the EITC are also highly correlated with the monthly SNAP caseload. The federal EITC expansions -particularly the 1993 expansion -were intended to ensure that joint receipt of SNAP and EITC would raise employed families' after-tax and after-benefit income above the federal poverty level. In three out of the four models, we estimate a positive effect of the EITC on caseloads after 12 months. However, we find that EITC benefits are associated with caseload reductions after 24 months. For every $1,000 increase in the monthly EITC benefit payout in the state, the SNAP caseload declined by 2.6 to 6.6 percent after 24 months. Our results suggest that in the long run increases in EITC generosity may influence food stamp recipients to either transition off the caseload or never apply for benefits. It is possible that the EITC's influence on labor supply and earned income may reduce eligibility or the benefits associated with SNAP participation (for example, Eissa and Liebman 1996) . In addition, the annual EITC payment may reduce SNAP eligibility if EITC recipients invest in Finally, the results on the long-run effect of unemployment on SNAP caseloads imply that a one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate is associated with a 4.5 to 11.4 percent increase in caseloads. The dynamic specifications predict that a one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate results in at least a 7 percent increase in the SNAP caseload, which is larger than the effect found in most recent studies Hoynes, 2012, 2013; Ziliak, 2013) , but similar to the finding of Klerman and Danielson (2011) .
V. Simulations
We use our regression estimates to.calculate the contribution of each explanatory variable to the predicted change in the caseload over a specified time period. We first calculate the predicted change in the caseload due to all observable factors over the chosen time period. We then calculate what the predicted change would have been, if the factor of interest were held constant at the baseline month. For example, we calculate the predicted change in the caseload from July 2000 to December 2011, holding SNAP policies at their July predicted change with SNAP policies held at the baseline level gives us the contribution of SNAP policies to the predicted caseload change. We estimate the share of our predicted caseload change that is due to changes in SNAP policies, Welfare Reform, the EITC and economic and seasonal factors. In each of our time periods, the actual change in household caseloads is larger than our predicted change. We report the simulated effect of the policy or economic changes as a share of the predicted change in caseloads, acknowledging that factors unobserved to us play a further role in actual caseload changes.
We use the estimates from the dynamic specification where the outcome variable is the number of SNAP households per capita and the estimates include 24 lags of the independent variables (Column 4 of Table 2 ). In this dynamic specification, SNAP policies have a direct effect on future caseloads, through the lag structure (and the estimates of the vector ), and, therefore, an indirect effect on future caseloads by affecting the lagged caseloads for future time periods (and the parameter estimates of the vector ). Our simulations account for both of these effects through an iterative process of predicting the 51 state SNAP caseloads, holding the set of covariates of interest constant between a beginning and ending time. Obviously, we estimate these contribution of the policy changes with error and so, in order to put standard errors on our estimates, we bootstrap with random draws from the parameters (specific details are available in an online appendix).. Table 5 shows the results of the simulations. We consider three distinct Overall, SNAP policies account for one-fifth of the predicted caseload increase.
In contrast to the 1993 to 2000 time period, the SNAP reforms generally expanded eligibility and reduced transaction costs and stigma. We estimate that the SNAP policy changes that expanded eligibility explain 12.1 percent of the 15 Individual SNAP policy reforms, like the EBT payouts are often very imprecisely estimated, as expected from the regression results in Table 2 , and we choose not to report the simulation results with them, although they are available upon request. Although there were some state specific changes in ABAWD policies, the data on their implementation have never been collected consistently, so we do not parameterize these changes in our empirical work. dramatic increase, with the adoption of broad-based categorical eligibility accounting for 4.3 percent of the increase. Reductions in transaction costs and stigma explain 9.2 percent of the caseload increase. Each of these are precisely estimated at standard levels. Because there was no change in our indicator variable for welfare reform during this period, it plays no estimated direct role in the expansion. Although we estimate the EITC to be a small positive factor in the caseload explosion, the estimate is again very imprecise. The economy continues to play a large role, but not as large as in the pre-2000 period, explaining only 39.0 percent of the caseload increase. 
VI. Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we examine the role of economic conditions and policy 
